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Abstract  
This article examines the origins, aims, and design of tax credits in the United Kingdom, and discusses the extent to which tax credits represent a new approach in social security policy. It then focuses on the role that these transfers play in supporting lone mothers in employment, drawing on the experiences of lone-parent families to explore how tax credits worked for them. The discussion highlights the tensions between family and employment change and tax credits rules about reporting changes in circumstances and income.
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Introduction
In the United Kingdom (UK) reshaping social security in order to make it contribute to better labour market outcomes has led to an increased focus on supporting incomes in work, using cash transfers to supplement wages and to “make work pay”. In 2003, two “tax credits” were introduced, one for families with children and the other for low-wage workers. These tax credits are assessed and paid as part of the tax, rather than the social security, system. Lone mothers – who often work part time and in low-paid jobs – are particularly likely to be receiving tax credits to supplement their wages, and tax credits are an important policy lever for increasing the lone-parent employment rate, which is one of the government’s current policy targets. This article discusses the design and delivery of tax credits in the UK and examines the role that these transfers play in supporting lone mothers in employment, including some qualitative evidence from an ongoing study of lone mothers leaving out-of-work benefits for employment.​[1]​

Tax credits: Aims, design and delivery
The Labour government elected in 1997 has pursued a very active programme of reform of social security for people of working age. The key policy goals are to raise employment rates, particularly for disadvantaged groups, and to eliminate child poverty. The two are seen as closely linked: “work is at the heart of our welfare reform programme ... paid work is the surest route out of poverty” (Department of Social Security, 1998, p. 3). These goals have been pursued by two main sets of policies.

First, the New Deal programmes aim to help unemployed and non-employed benefit claimants into work, through a mix of jobsearch support, training and practical help to make the transition to work. Benefit claims and employment services are now integrated into a single service (Jobcentre Plus) and requirements on claimants to participate in these programmes have been increased. The aim is to shift from a “passive” system of social security as wage replacement to a more “active” labour-market oriented system focused on getting people off benefits and into work.

Second, there are the “make work pay” provisions, aimed at increasing financial incentives to work. These include the introduction of a national minimum wage, reductions in tax and national insurance contributions, and the introduction of a new system of income transfers to working people, in the form of tax credits.

The origin of the UK’s tax credit system is sometimes ascribed to the example of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States (US), for example by Giddens (2006). However, although the US experience was undoubtedly influential, the origins of the UK tax credit system can be traced more directly within the UK system itself (Millar, 2003; Adler, 2004; Bennett, 2005). There has been a system of wage supplementation in the UK since the early 1970s, initially as a relatively small benefit and only for low-paid full-time workers with dependent children. Coverage was extended to part-time workers in the 1980s and 1990s, and the level of support was increased.

The post-1997 Labour government introduced reforms in two stages. The Working Families Tax Credit, introduced in 1999, was essentially the same as Family Credit, which it replaced, except that it was paid by the Inland Revenue rather than the Department of Social Security.​[2]​ The real change came at the next stage, in 2003, when the “next generation” tax credits – the Child Tax Credit and the Working Tax Credit – were introduced.

The aims for tax credits were set out by HM Treasury (2002, p. 4) as follows:

–	supporting families with children, recognising the responsibilities that come with parenthood;
–	tackling child poverty, by offering the greatest help to those most in need, such as low-income families;
–	helping to make sure that work pays more than welfare and that people have incentives to move up the earnings ladder.

These two tax credits are administered through the same system, with a single claiming process (discussed further below), but they are targeted rather differently. The Child Tax Credit (CTC) is designed to include the majority of families with children. It does this in two ways. First, it covers children in both working and non-working families. Under the previous system children in working families were supported through Family Credit and those in non-working families through Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance. CTC is designed to cover both groups and thus to provide an integrated system of support for all children. Second, there is a relatively generous income test which means that most middle-income families (and some high-earning families if they have large families) are eligible for a flat-rate amount, the so-called “family element” that is paid per family and not per child. Most families with children are eligible at least for this family element [which was £545 per annum in 2007-8] while lower-income families also receive the child element [up to £1,845 per annum per child in 2007-8] (In December 2007, £1 = €1.38 approx.; or US$2.03 approx.). This is what the Treasury calls “progressive universalism”, which aims at “supporting all children but offering the greatest help to those who need it most” (HM Treasury, 2002, p. 4).​[3]​

Unlike the broad population coverage of CTC, the Working Tax Credit (WTC) is designed to be targeted on low-wage earners. Those with children are eligible if they work for 16 hours or more per week. Childless people may also be eligible if they are aged 25 or older and working at least 30 hours per week, or if they have a disability, or if they are aged 50 or older and have been out of work for at least six months. Eligibility is within quite a narrow band of income before being tapered away quite steeply (at a rate of 37 pence for every pound). The WTC also includes a childcare costs element, which is restricted to single-earner couples and lone parents, who are using formal care, and pays 80 per cent of costs up to a fixed maximum amount.

Table 1 Tax credits receipt 2003/4 to 2005/6, millions

	2003/4millions	2004/5millions	2005/6millions	2005/6£million
Total number of recipients	5.74	5.89	5.94	18,585
Out of work: families with children1	1.40	1.38	1.41	  5,474
In work: no children	0.16	0.23	0.27	     520
In work: families with children	4.17	4.28	4.26	12,591
				
In-work families with children				
CTC – family element or less	2.09	2.15	2.10	1,201
CTC – family and child element	0.64	0.68	0.66	1,742
CTC and WTC	1.44	1.45	1.50	9,648
				
1. About half of these families receive CTC and half receive the equivalent in child premia to other benefits.
Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2007a), Table 1.1.

Receipt of tax credits
Thus, there are different groups in the population who are eligible for either CTC or WTC or for both. Table 1 shows the main groups in receipt in the three tax years from 2003/4 to 2005/6,​[4]​ and the expenditure in 2005/6. In total there are almost six million households in receipt. This includes 1.4 million non-employed families with children receiving CTC or the equivalent as part of their out of work benefits. It also includes working people without children who were brought into this system of in-work support for the first time in 2003. Their numbers have almost doubled since 2003, although they remain a small part of the total.

However, the main group of interest for this discussion are working families with children. About 4.26 million of these families are receiving tax credits, out of a total of about six million working families with children in the UK. There are about two million families receiving the family element of CTC only or less. These are the higher-income families. About £1.2 billion was spent on CTC payments for these families in 2005/6. About 664,000 families received CTC at more than the family element and 1.5 million families received both CTC and WTC. These are the lower-income families – in total about 2.16 million families – and they account for the bulk of the tax credit expenditure, about £11.4 billion in 2005/6.

Estimating take-up for tax credits is complex for various reasons, including that the survey data on which estimates are based collects data on weekly, rather than annual, income. HM Revenue and Customs (2007b) estimate caseload take-up rates in 2004/5 of between 80-84 per cent for CTC and between 59-64 per cent for WTC. This means about one million families are not receiving WTC to which they are entitled. Among working families, lone parents are estimated to have higher take-up rates than couples (89-96 per cent compared with 73-78 per cent).

If we compare current numbers of tax credit recipients with the situation in 1995-6, it is clear that there has been a very substantial increase in the number of families receiving in-work means-tested support. At that time there were about 0.7 million working families with children receiving Family Credit, compared with the 4.3 working million families with children now receiving some tax credit payment. Even if we confine the comparison just to the 2.16 million lower-income families (as defined above), there has still been a three-fold increase in the number of families in receipt of such support.

Assessing entitlement
The tax credits have been described and promoted by the government as a new and progressive system of support, designed to meet the needs of a modern economy and to overcome the problems associated with in-work means-tested benefits in the past.

Delivery through the tax system, rather than through the social security system, was central to the design from the start, not least because the government was keen to associate tax credits with participation in employment. As an early Treasury paper put it, “A tax credit will associate the payment in the recipient’s mind with the fact of working, a potentially valuable psychological change” (Taylor, 1998, p. 8). It was also argued that association with the tax system would make this transfer more popular with the public at large, because it would be seen as a positive reward for work, rather than as a handout for dependency. A tax credit rather than a social security benefit would “reduce the stigma associated with claiming in-work support, and encourage higher take-up” (UK HM Treasury, 1998, p. 3).

One of the goals for the Treasury was that tax credits should combine “continuity of support for those who are not experiencing significant changes in circumstances or income, with the ability to adjust quickly for those who are facing major changes” (UK HM Treasury, 2002, p. 19). This would be achieved by a “light touch” income test, which would use a minimum of information to assess entitlement on an annual basis. The starting point is taxable gross family income in the previous tax year. The tax credits are cumulative amounts paid over the year with any discrepancies between the provisional award (based on income in the previous tax year) and the finalised award (based on income in the current tax year) dealt with by means of an end of year reconciliation. Some changes in circumstances during the year terminate the award and must therefore be notified to HM Revenue and Customs, so that a reassessment can be made. These include changes to number of adults in the family, ceasing to use childcare or significant reductions in childcare costs, and the birth of a child. Other changes, in particular changes in income, need not be notified unless the recipient chooses to do so (but some rules have been changed since 2005/6, see further discussion below). Hence at the year-end, some recipients will have been underpaid (if income in the current year is lower than income in the previous year) and some will have been overpaid (if income in the current year is higher than income in the previous year). Underpayments are covered by a lump-sum payment at the end of the year. Overpayments are recovered either by adjusting subsequent tax credit awards or by adjusting the main tax codes if tax credits are no longer due.

Thus, some underpayments and overpayments are inherent in the design of tax credits. However, in practice, there has been a much higher volume of these than the government seems to have expected. Statistics from HM Revenue and Customs (2007b) show that, at the tax year ending April 2006, out of 6.5 million tax credit awards, there were about 886,000 underpayments (14 per cent) and 1.9 million overpayments (29 per cent). Underpayments amounted to about £550 million and overpayments to about £1,570 million. Of both underpayments and overpayments about 330 thousand were awards of the CTC family element or less (i.e. to the higher income families) and about 1.25 million were awards of CTC at more than the family element and of CTC plus WTC (i.e. to the lower-income families). These figures are for awards, and not numbers in receipt, and so cannot be directly compared with the numbers shown in Table 1 above. But this does suggest that underpayments and overpayments are more common in the awards to lower-income families. This is probably not surprising given the construction of the means test, in which there is a wide range of income across which the higher-income families receive the same amount. But it may also reflect greater volatility of income and circumstances among the poorer families, as well as the fact that they are receiving a more complex package of transfers, including the childcare element of WTC (see further discussion below).

A new approach to social security?
There are therefore several features of these tax credits which are new to the UK system. These include:

	The use of the tax system to assess and make payments.
	An income test based on an annual assessment of entitlement.
	A simple definition of gross income, not taking into account capital assets.
	Limited responsiveness to changes in income and other circumstances during the period of the award.
	The separate tax credits for children and adults.
	An integrated system of support for all children, regardless of the employment status of their parents (not yet fully achieved in practice).
	The inclusion of childless and single people.

There are also relatively high amounts of money involved, especially for low-paid families with children. For example, in April 2006, a lone mother with one child younger than age 11 working for 20 hours at the national minimum wage of £5.05 per hour would receive about £63 per week in Working Tax Credit, about £44 in Child Tax Credit, about £12 in housing and council tax benefit and £17 in Child Benefit. Accordingly more than half of her income in work would come from state transfers. A couple with two children younger than age 11 and one earner working for 35 hours at 1.5 times the national minimum wage would receive about £13 per week in Working Tax Credit, about £78 in Child Tax Credit and £29 in Child Benefit, about a third of their total income (UK Department for Work and Pensions, 2006).

Therefore, there are various innovations in the design, coverage and level of tax credits compared with the UK’s traditional means-tested social security support. Tax credits highlight the way that the UK income maintenance system is increasingly focused on wage supplementation rather than on wage replacement, which was the rationale for the Beveridge welfare state (Millar, 2003). Adler (2004, p. 103) argues that the tax credits and the New Deal programmes represent a “new and distinctive” approach to social security, which he describes as an “employment model”. Similarly Dobrowolsky and Jenson (2005) place tax credits in the context of the “social investment” welfare state, which in the UK has been characterised by policies to improve skills for employment, to invest in children, and to enable people to build up assets. The social investment model is based on an analysis that stresses the need to respond to “new social risks” that have been created by changes in family and household structures and in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Giddens, Diamond and Liddle, 2006). The UK tax credits are a specific attempt to cover these new risks (Adler, 2004). They are intended to provide income support to people in potentially adverse labour market situations, including low pay, self-employment, part-time work, and temporary or irregular work. They are also intended to enable families with just one earner, especially lone-parent families, to sustain employment.

The UK is not alone in seeking to develop systems of in-work support using the tax system, in order to improve financial incentives to work. Tax credits are also used in a similar way in the USA, Canada and Australia, albeit with various different design features (Whiteford, Mendelson and Millar, 2003). Some European countries have also introduced, or considered introducing, similar provisions, again in the context of welfare-to-work or activation policies (Gradus and Julsing, 2001; Barbier, 2001; Knijn, Martin and Millar, 2007; Zaidi, 2008).

Effective social protection for these new social risks must be able to offer support that provides security but which is also responsive to changing needs. An attempt to balance security with responsiveness is central to the design of the UK tax credits. But it is also very challenging to achieve in practice, as various reports highlighting problems with the tax credit system have shown (for example, Citizen’s Advice Bureau, 2005; Griggs, McAllister and Walker, 2005; Bourn, 2004; UK Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, 2005; UK House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2006a; UK House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007).​[5]​ In the next section we examine the implementation of tax credits from the perspective of one of the key target groups: lone parents.

Lone mothers and tax credits
There are about 1.9 million lone parents, mostly women, in the UK, making up about one quarter of families with children. Lone parents who are not employed can receive out-of-work benefits as long as their youngest child is younger than age 16. However, since 2001 lone parents receiving such benefits have been required to attend regular “work-focused” interviews and this condition has been applied to wider groups of lone parents over time. The government now proposes that from 2008 lone parents with a child aged 12 or older will be required to fulfil the same work conditions as unemployed claimants (i.e. that they must be available for work) and from 2010 this condition will apply to those with children aged seven or older (UK Department for Work and Pensions, 2007).

Employment rates have been on the increase for lone parents in recent years, due to a combination of improved state support, more availability of employment opportunities, and a shift in the characteristics of lone parents towards older mothers with older children (Gregg, Harkness and Macmillan, 2006). In the mid-1990s the employment rate for lone mothers was about 44 per cent and this had risen to about 56 per cent by 2006. Almost all of these working lone parents are likely to be in receipt of tax credits.​[6]​









Family element or less	11	62
More than family element	89	38
Child Tax Credit only	10	   17
Tapered Working Tax Credit	52	16







Number of families (millions)	1.05	3.21
Number of children (millions)	1.62	5.80
Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2007a).

Tax credits have played an important role in increasing lone-parent employment rates and in reducing in-work poverty. Brewer, Duncan and Shephard (2007) estimate that the Working Families Tax Credit increased employment among lone mothers by around five percentage points. Tax credits have been an important factor in the reduction of child poverty among working lone-parent families, with much of the fall in child poverty rates since 2001 attributed to the impact of tax credits (Harker, 2006). The child poverty rate for children of non-working lone parents is about 57 per cent. This falls to 17 per cent for part-time work and seven per cent for full-time work [using a poverty line set at 60 per cent of median household equivalized income, before housing costs] (Brewer, Goodman, Muriel and Sibieta, 2007). Gardiner and Millar (2006) examine how low-paid workers avoid poverty and show that, among lone parents working at least 16 hours per week, only six per cent were able to avoid poverty through their wages alone, but a further 40 per cent were lifted out of poverty by tax credits. Tax credits certainly form an important part of the income of working lone parents. The published tax credits statistics do not show average amounts for lone parents separately, but do show that the average annual amount in 2005-6 for a one-child family (about 60 per cent of lone parents have one child) was about £5,000 for families receiving WTC and CTC (UK HM Revenue and Customs, 2007a, Table 2.2). Estimates from 2005 survey data show a similar amount, with lone parents working 16 hours or more per week receiving an average of £58 per week in WTC and £43 in CTC, a total of about £5,250 per year (Lyons, Barnes and Millar, 2008).

However, there are also some potentially problematic issues for lone parents in the way that tax credits work in practice. First, there are high marginal tax rates associated with these levels of means-tested support and these apply to a significant number of families. Adam, Brewer and Shephard (2006) calculate that over two-thirds of lone parents have an effective marginal tax rate of over 50 per cent. Second, for low-wage lone parents in particular, the total income package is very complex. Income comes into the family from a number of different sources, possibly including wages, child benefit, CTC, WTC, the childcare element, housing benefit, and council tax benefit. There may also be child support payments from the separated partner. When income is so complex it may also be insecure. Hills, McKnight and Smithies (2006) tracked weekly incomes for a sample of 93 families over a period of 12 months and similarly found that lone parents were one of the groups with the highest income variability. Tax credit changes were a significant source of this variability and the majority of the families had had their tax credits reassessed during the year. Research from One Parent Families (2005) found that, among 100 lone parents, half had between two and seven changes in circumstances over a 12-month period. Third, as discussed above, it seems that families in receipt of both WTC and CTC are particularly at risk of underpayment or overpayment of their tax credits. In 2005-6 there were 174,000 underpaid awards to lower-income lone parents (i.e. those receiving CTC at more than the family element and those receiving CTC and WTC) and 239,000 overpaid awards (UK HM Revenue and Customs, 2007a). It seems likely that at least two-fifths of lone parents receiving tax credits have been affected by overpayment or underpayment.

How does the tax credit system look from the perspective of lone mothers themselves? In our ongoing qualitative research, we have been exploring how lone mothers and their children experience and manage the move into paid employment from out-of-work benefits.​[7]​ We carried out interviews in early 2004 with 50 lone mothers and 61 of their 8- to14-year-old children. The mothers had all started working and receiving tax credits between October 2002 and October 2003. About 12 to 18 months later, we re-interviewed 44 mothers and 53 children. Here we discuss their responses to the tax credit system. Other papers have explored issues in the transition to work, how children experience changes in the family when the mother starts work, and the role that children play in helping mothers to sustain employment (Millar, 2006; Ridge, 2006; Ridge and Millar, 2006; Ridge, 2007).

These interviews highlighted the importance of tax credits both in enabling the lone mothers to make the move into work from out-of-work benefits, and in sustaining employment over time. Tax credits were a significant component of income for these families, as one woman stated:

“They’ve been very important, because I couldn’t have afforded to work without them; they’ve raised my income up that much.”

Many of the women were in relatively low-paid jobs and/or were working part-time. Weekly earnings were not high and tax credits were an essential addition to wages. Therefore it was important for these families that they received their tax credits quickly and accurately when they started work. Many of the women had help from a ‘Personal Adviser’ at the time they started work. Personal Advisers are one of the innovations of the New Deal programmes and the reformed Jobcentre Plus. It is their job to work with individuals, offering advice and information about jobs, training, childcare, child support and in-work financial support. They can help to arrange various “benefit run-ons”, whereby income support and/or housing benefit continue to be paid during the first few weeks in work, and for the payment of any “back to work bonuses” that might be available. They can also help with claims for tax credits, helping to complete the necessary forms and “fast tracking” these, so that claims are made expeditiously.

About 30 of the 50 women had some help from Personal Advisers and in general this did help to smooth the process. For example, Mary had been on income support for about one year after she separated from her husband and she was now working for 21 hours per week:

“Yes, I did go to a fantastic lady … with the job centre, and she was the one that helped me, worked out the tax credit, all my benefits, and she got me some shoes for my first job … she was great …[and] helped me with the process of filling in the forms … [and with] anything that went awry, she helped me through … It was quick … and the payment right …” 

But over half of the women did have some difficulties as they started work, especially those with complex work or family situations. There were delays in payments, incorrect payments, difficulties in getting information about what was happening, and lack of information about the award. Things were also more likely to go wrong when childcare tax credit was being claimed, with seven out of the nine women getting childcare tax credit reporting some problems. These delays could be the cause of financial problems or debts:

“I had the nursery screaming at me, saying: look, we need some money.”

Whether things went wrong or not, the women did not always understand how their total payment broke down into the different elements:

“… there is no breakdown so you don’t know what you should be getting or why” …“the form they send to you to show how they've worked it out is not detailed enough, because it just says what you've told them and how much you are going to get. They have not said how they've worked it out.”

Problems with tax credits for some women were compounded by difficulties in accessing other sources of income. Housing benefits were often inaccurately assessed, delayed, wrongly paid or not paid at all. Child Support payments due from former partners were often unreliable. Wages were not necessarily fixed either as hours of work sometimes changed or were variable from week to week. All this uncertainty made for some ambivalence among the women as to whether they were, or were not, financially better-off in work. Paying off debts, and meeting other in-work costs such as transport and childcare, also reduced the gains from working. Nevertheless most of the women were committed to trying to stay in work, and invested a lot of effort in this despite sometimes difficult work and home situations. In part this was because they wanted to be independent of out-of-work benefits, but they also wanted to work for financial, social, self-esteem and identity reasons.

The labour market experience of these women was, however, characterised by change. There were many changes of both jobs and hours of work in the first few months after starting work. Between the first and second interviews six women had left work, 11 had changed jobs and 15 were in the same job but had changed hours. One woman was out of work at both interviews. There were just 11 women who were in the same job with the same hours at the first and second interviews. In addition, there were other changes in their lives – new partners, children leaving home, babies born, changes in childcare, moving house – that could also affect their tax credit entitlement.

Most of the women were still receiving tax credits at the second interview and, as at the first interview, these were almost always described as an essential part of income:

“… very, very important because there’s no way I would have been able to survive on my wages alone, and [especially] with child care costs.”

The women had all been through at least one renewal and several had had other reassessments as their circumstances changed. Most had managed the process but were nevertheless unclear about how their entitlement was worked out, or why they sometimes had to pay money back. As one woman resignedly put it:

“They ask for information. I provide the information. They say I haven’t done this, so I do it again … Apparently they’d overpaid me so I had to pay something back, so I didn’t have any Tax Credits. I don’t understand the system at all … I’ve just never really looked into them to be honest, I never have time.”

The heavy reliance on tax credits to make up income made some of the women very anxious and uncertain:

“… honestly it’s like a death sentence waiting to come through that door. The thing is, you end up having to rely on that money and you wait for that letter, and you know it’s coming … when it gets to like April the fifth it’s the new tax year, and you know that letter’s coming, so you’re waiting for it and when it comes you’re just like so … so you fill it in, send it off, and then you’re just waiting and waiting for it to come. It’s an awful feeling … what if it’s less than what it was last year … [because] everything’s gone up, my mortgage has gone up … [but] my wages haven’t gone up since last year.”

We can describe one case to illustrate the gaps that can exist between people’s lives and the tax credit system. At the first interview Chloe had been a lone parent for about two years, she had three children younger than age ten, and had just started working in an office of a retail establishment. Her initial claim for tax credits had been paid promptly, although made more complex because she was claiming for childcare:

“The forms are quite confusing when you want childcare, because [paying for childcare] goes on a term more than it goes monthly … so you have to work out each term, how often they’re going to be in and on what days, and then like, try and balance it out from there.”

By the second interview Chloe was manager of the office and working for more hours. She also had a new partner, who was living with her and her children, and whose own children stayed with them every other weekend. The tax credits were still an important part of her income:

“… they have obviously … been a big help, even on … my wages of £750 a month. If it weren’t for my tax credits, then there would be no point in working.”

But living with a partner meant that she had to notify UK HM Customs and Revenue and change her claim. This had led to her payments being stopped while her claim was reassessed and she was still waiting for her award to be sorted out. In her account of the process, Chloe reflected on the issue of the financial obligations of a new partner and what should be expected:

“They can drop my money to a certain degree but I can’t see how they can take all of [partner’s] wages into consideration … my children aren’t dependent on him. They’re dependent on me and I’m the one that goes to work. I’m the one that pays the child care costs. I’m the one that feeds and clothes them. I don’t receive any maintenance out of his money. Himself, he pays maintenance to his ex-wife to support his own children, so I can’t see how they can balance that one out. I don’t understand that. I know they’ve got to take it so much into consideration, but we’re not even married … we’ve got no children together. So I don’t know really how that’s going to affect the money.”

She was also concerned about the implications of reporting a change in circumstances which might not itself be stable:

“I’ve got to let them know if the circumstances change, which I know [but] … it’s hard to declare it straightaway … you’ve still got it at the back of your mind that if you do declare it straightaway, and then everything fell apart, you’d have to wait until April to reclaim your money back … it’s just a big gamble to take …”

The family-based assessment for tax credits creates this new version of the “cohabitation” rule (that couples living together have joint income), a rule which has always proved difficult for social security officials to judge and implement. The extensive coverage of tax credits among employed lone parents means that few lone parents will in future escape official scrutiny of their relationships.

Balancing security and responsiveness?
Tax credits are a major innovation in UK social security policy and the extent and scale of this should not be underestimated. They have brought the tax system directly into the role of assessing and delivering income maintenance. This is a substantial cultural as well as practical change. They have brought many more families into the realm of income-tested support. They provide a significant addition to the earnings of low-paid people. They make part-time work financially feasible for many lone parents. As the UK House of Commons Treasury Committee report points out:

despite the difficulties associated with tax credits, the regime still enjoys a great deal of support and goodwill … the policy underpinning tax credits of taking people, and especially children, out of poverty is laudable … the programme has had considerable success (2006, para 4).

The experiences of our sample of lone mothers clearly illustrate the importance of tax credits to the incomes of these lone-mother families. But they also highlight some of the tensions and practical difficulties that arise in a system seeking to balance security of payments with responsiveness to changes in circumstances. Baroness Hollis of Heigham was Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Work and Pensions, between 1997 and 2005, as the tax credits were being planned and implemented. Speaking in a House of Lords debate (23 October 2006), she argued that:
It is fair to say that when we introduced the Tax Credits Bill we did not predict that 50 per cent of lone parents would undergo more than a dozen changes in circumstance a year. Those include changes in childcare arrangements virtually every school holiday, changes in hours worked and sometimes a change of partner.

It is true that there was little data available at the time on the extent of changes that the system would have to cope with. But the Australian experience with their system of tax credits did suggest that many families would experience such changes over a 12-month period (Whiteford, Mendelson and Millar, 2003).

It is among the lower-income families where most of the difficulties have occurred, both because of the complexity of their income packages and the volatility of their circumstances. As a result, it is the most vulnerable families who face the most problems in making the system work for them, and who may therefore be reluctant to trust in the promise to “make work pay” (Smithies, 2007). One of the lone mothers we interviewed had had no problems herself, but said:

“It makes me very angry for people who it does affect, because … the reason I went to work was that [I felt] encouragement … I think that if people are having hassle, then the encouragement feels as though it has been withdrawn already.”

As we have discussed, overpayments are built into the design of the system and repaying these can be a major problem for the lower-income families who depend on tax credits to make work financially feasible.
In 2005 and 2006 various changes were announced in order to try and improve the administration of tax credits, to reduce the level of overpayments, and to reduce the impact on families of repaying overpayments. These reforms (summarised in Brewer, 2006) include a number of key elements. First, there is an increase in the annual income disregard from £2,500 to £25,000. This disregard means that families can have an increase in income of up to £25,000 in the current award year before their tax credits are affected. Second, families who report a fall in income will no longer receive an immediate payment to make up their entitlement, but will have to wait until the end of year reconciliation. Third, within the current tax year, limits will be imposed on the extent to which tax credit payments can be reduced to recover higher payments in the earlier part of the year. This is intended to ensure that lower-income families do not face large and sudden falls in their tax credit income. These measures are aimed at reducing both the level and impact of overpayments. In effect they make the system operate more like a fixed-period award, because they mean that income changes in the current tax year will not be fully taken into account until the end of that year or, in the case of large income rises, until the following award year.

There are also changes to the reporting requirements. The range of changes in circumstances that must be reported has been expanded to include changes in working status and in the number of children in the household. The time allowed to report such changes is also reduced from three months to one. This places a greater onus on recipients to know and to comply with the rules. As Brewer (2006) points out, this is more like the rules that have always applied to means-tested benefits. The “light touch” means test has become heavier for recipients, but the research evidence suggests that many people will continue to be unclear about what exactly is required of them, and when. Recipients may lose out as a consequence, since underpayments are backdated by a maximum of three months while overpayments are calculated back to the date of the change in circumstance. There are also penalties of up to £300 for failure to report those changes in circumstances which require a reassessment.
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